The Embodied Self

Jay A.=20 Seitz

City University of = New York=20 (USA)

and

New School = University=20 (USA)

Department of = Political=20 Science & Psychology, AC-4D06, York

College/City = University of=20 New York (CUNY), Jamaica, NY 11451, USA,

(718) 262-2691=20 (tel/fax). URL and = e-mail:=20

http://www.york.cuny.edu/~seitz/bio.html and seitz@york.cuny.edu.

13^th = Annual=20 Meeting of the Jean Piaget Society, Paper Session 12: Minds = and Selves=20 Embodied, June 3, 2000, Montreal, Canada

Abstract

=20 Traditional cognitive theories of selfhood (e.g., schema theory, = trait=20 theory, self-attribution theory) assume that self and personal identity = are=20 wholly mind-based. The = body,=20 however, plays a significant role in the construction of this sense of=20 self. Indeed, there is a = evidence=20 for a distributed neural network, including the somatosensory cortex, = limbic=20 system, and cortical regions central to object- and self-recognition, = that forms=20 the neural basis for corporeal awareness, that is, one's representation = of one's=20 body or "body schema". We = suggest=20 that this body schema changes over time and, as a result, one's personal = identity is modulated by body-centered = representations.

Introduction and Background

=20 Description of the problem. Traditional cognitive theories = of=20 selfhood (e.g., schema theory, trait theory, self-attribution theory) = assume=20 that self and personal identity are wholly mind-based. Indeed, a review of four major = journals=20 in personality theory and research in the last two years (J. of=20 Personality, J. of Personality and Social Psychology, = Personality=20 and Individual Differences, and Personality and Social Psychology = Bulletin) indicates that not a single article veered from this = theoretical=20 and research agenda.

The body, however, = plays a=20 significant role in the construction of this sense of self. Indeed, there is a evidence = for a=20 distributed neural network, including the somatosensory cortex, limbic = system,=20 and cortical regions central to object- and self-recognition, that forms = the=20 neural basis for corporeal awareness, that is, one's representation of = one's=20 body or "body schema" (Berlucchi & Aglioti, 1997). We suggest that this body = schema changes=20 over time and, as a result, one's personal identity is modulated by=20 body-centered representations. = That=20 is to say, one's personal identity and sense of self are constructed = from=20 body-centered representations that are modulated over time by = changes to=20 one's body schema. As = such, it=20 supports post-Piagetian hypotheses that the sensorimotor stage extends = across=20 the lifespan (Carlson & Seitz, 1998; Mirani & Seitz, 1998; Lopez = &=20 Seitz, 1998; Seitz, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2000a, 2000b; Smartt & Seitz, = 1999;=20 2000). We present = evidence for this=20 position based on case studies of normal subjects (e.g., self-image in = relation=20 to cultural views of beauty) and of subjects with damage to the brain = that=20 distort these body schemas and thus result in a distorted sense of self = (e.g.,=20 depression, dissociation disorders, and psychosis).

=20 Outline of the argument. Access to one's emotions, the = ability to=20 symbolically elaborate on one's feelings, the skill in using = cognitive-affective=20 states to guide one's behavior, and the capacity to read intentions in = and=20 influence others constitutes a working definition of personal identity = and one's=20 sense of self (Gardner, 1993). =20 However, personal identity is not solely mind-based. According to a recent theory = by Antonio=20 Damasio (1994), the body influences personality by tagging affective = states with=20 somatic markers. A = somatic marker=20 is a visceral or nonvisceral sensation that marks a cognitive-affective=20 state. It is acquired = through both=20 internal, biological preferences and external, cultural = prescriptions. Thus, basic bodily regulatory = systems=20 influence conscious, cognitive processes. =20 Subjectivity arises from changes that take place in bodily = states. That is, subjective awareness = of self=20 may arise by way of the body's awareness of itself through = interoceptive,=20 exteroceptive, and prioprioceptive senses (Damasio, 1999).

=20

=20 From the study of the brain's prefrontal cortices, three sets of = neural=20 structures have been identified by Damasio and are hypothesized to = underlie the=20 sense of self: (a) = sensory cortices=20 (object representation), (b) sensorimotor cortices = (self-representation), and=20 (c) subcortical structures such as the cerebellum, basal ganglia, and = thalamus=20 (self-representations created as a result of the self responding to the=20 environment). Since these = linked=20 structures are nonverbal and constitute bodily-based representations, = they might=20 also occur in infrahuman primates and other = species.

=20 Indeed, recent findings in the neurosciences indicate reciprocal = and=20 parallel neural pathways between the cerebellum, traditionally viewed as = controlling gross and fine motor functions but now hypothesized to play = a much=20 larger role in thought itself, and the frontal cortex where working = memory,=20 executive functions, and aspects of one's sense of self are housed. For instance, there is = evidence that inadequate network connections = among the=20 dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, thalamic pathways, and cerebellar sites = leads to=20 "cognitive dysmetria" or problems in the processing, coordination, and=20 prioritizing of information that may play a role in the genesis of = schizophrenia=20 and other disorders of personal identity (Andreasen, Paradiso, & = O=92Leary,=20 1998). Similarly, the = "cerebellar=20 cognitive affective syndrome" is linked to disturbances in language and=20 personality because of disruption of=20 these network connections (Schmahmann & Sherman,=20 1998).

=20 We look at one case study that underlies changes in = personality. In Case Study 1, a 40-year-old = female=20 with a personal history of self-preoccupation with the body modulated = her sense=20 of identity and changes in her body with age were yoked to this sense of = identity.

Case Study

=20 Case study 1. =20 The subject (L. S.) is a single, female, 40-years-old (b. = 7.19.59), AB=20 degree (Wesleyan), MBA degree (Wharton), institutional bond sales, = presently=20 unemployed, who lives in New York City (Manhattan). L. S. is 5=926=94 tall, = approximately 105=20 pounds, slender and small-boned. = She comes from a family of four daughters, both parents are = physicians=20 and live in NYC, eldest daughter (44 years) is a lawyer and divorced and = lives=20 in NYC, second oldest (43 years) is a physician with children who lives = in=20 Vermont, and the youngest daughter (39 years) is married with children = and lives=20 in Seattle.

=20 L.S. describes herself as a late-bloomer with secondary sex=20 characteristics developing later than normal (e.g., small breasts) = [body=20 representation]. L.S. = began=20 creative movement classes in fourth grade and by fifth grade had started = ballet. She continued = ballet until=20 eight grade and then took it up again after college [proprioceptive=20 senses]. L.S. grew up = on Long=20 Island, NY and had many friends until college where she found herself at = a=20 college where she felt not accepted and isolated socially. She experienced problems in = focusing her=20 attention on studying and college. =20 She began to focus instead on her body, eating, and exercise=20 [interoceptive and proprioceptive senses]. Although she received a fair = amount of=20 romantic attention from men, in her junior year she weighed about 100 = lbs and=20 felt =93unsatisfied with the way she looked=94 [body = representation]. L.S. describes herself as shy = as a child=20 and hypersensitive since childhood. =20 However, she is able to speak easily about her feelings and = expresses=20 them through dance. In = other words,=20 she has good sense of who she is but her interactions with others are=20 problematic [personal identity].

She reports = feeling=20 particularly uncomfortable with games with peers that involved touch = (e.g.,=20 writing on each other=92s backs in the family pool) [exteroceptive=20 senses]. Her parents = and family=20 stressed career and social status growing up and criticized her for = being =93too=20 thin or not eating enough=94 [body representation]. On the other hand, many (but = not all=20 peers) emphasized being physically attractive and appealing (e.g., = wearing a=20 bikini) [cultural prescriptions, body=20 representation].

=20 Currently, L. S. describes herself as being not being proud but = shameful=20 of her body: =93don=92t deserve food or sex because I am such a = miserable=20 person=94. She claims her = =93body feels=20 dirty=94 (i.e., disgusting) [somatic marker] and a =93used = good.=94 Indeed, she believes that = pregnancy will=20 lead to permanent damage to her body [body representation]. L.S. has experienced = premenstrual=20 syndrome starting in her mid-thirties that makes her feel tense, = difficulty=20 relaxing, emotionally labile, irritable, frequent headaches, and food = cravings=20 [somatic marker =96 interoceptive senses]. She compensates for her change = in sense=20 of self through use of alcohol in the evenings to relax (recently = curtailed)=20 [somatic marker =96 interoceptive senses], and physical exercise = including=20 running, swimming, floor barre classes, weight training, and yoga=20 [proprioceptive senses]. =20 L.S. spent a year or so in therapy with a psychiatrist who placed = her on=20 Zoloft, a serotonin agonist [interoceptive senses]. However, she reports only = moderate=20 changes in the way she feels about herself. She reports dressing in an = understated=20 way as well as making little use of cosmetics or coiffed hair [body=20 representation].

Implications

While traditional = theories=20 of selfhood have posited that personality is wholly mind-based, new = views of the=20 brain and the role of sensorimotor capacities in cognition and cognitive = development, suggest that one's sense of self and personal identity are=20 constructed from body-centered representations that are modulated by = changes to=20 one's body schema. = Indeed, evidence=20 presented from both case studies of self-image in relation to cultural = views of=20 beauty and the breakdown of personal identity after brain damage and as = a result=20 of mental illness, support this view--the bodily basis of self and = personal=20 identity.

References

Andreasen, N. C., = Paradiso,=20 S., & O=92Leary, D. S. (1998). =20 =93Cognitive dysmetria=94 as an integrative theory of = schizophrenia: A=20 dysfunction in cortical-subcortical-cerebellar circuitry? Schizophrenia Bulletin, = 24(2),=20 203-218.

Berlucchi, G., = &=20 Aglioti, S. (1997). The = body in the=20 brain: Neural bases of corporeal awareness. Trends in Neurosciences, = 20(12),=20 560-564.

=20 Carlson, S., & Seitz, J. A.. (1998, August). The = development=20 of kinesthetic intelligence in children. Paper presented at = the New=20 York Academy of Sciences, New York, NY.

=20 Damasio, A. R. (1994). =20 Descartes=92 error: Emotion, reason, and the human = brain. NY: Avon = Books.

=20 Damasio, A. R. (1999). =20 The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of = consciousness. NY: = Harcourt=20 Brace.

=20 Gardner, H. (1993). =20 Frames of mind: = The=20 theory of multiple intelligences. (Rev. ed.). NY: Basic = Books.

Mirani, C., & = Seitz, J.=20 A.. (1998, August). Development of bodily-gestural skills in = children.=20 Paper presented at the New York Academy of Sciences, New York,=20 NY.

Lopez, O., & = Seitz, J.=20 A. (1998, November). = The bodily=20 basis of thought: observational data. Poster presented at the Annual = Meeting=20 of the National Minority Research Symposium, New York, = NY.

Schmahmann, J. D., = &=20 Sherman, J. C. (1998). = The=20 cerebellar cognitive affective syndrome. =20 Brain, 121, 561-579.

=20 Seitz, J. A. (1992). = The=20 development of bodily-kinesthetic

intelligence in = children:=20 Implications for education and artistry. =20 Holistic Education Review, 5(2),=20 35-39.

Seitz, J. A. = (1996). The development of aesthetic=20 movement:

Linkages to = preschool=20 education. Journal of = Early=20 Education and Family Review, 5(3), 7-9.

Seitz, J. A. = (1999,=20 June). The bodily = basis of=20 thought. Paper = presented at the=20 29^th Annual Symposium of the Jean Piaget Society, Mexico = City,=20 Mexico.

Seitz, J. A. = (2000a). The bodily basis of = thought. New Ideas in Psychology: An = International Journal of Innovative Theory in Psychology, 18(1),=20 23-40.

Seitz, J. (2000b,=20 June). Embodied=20 cognition. Paper = presented at=20 the 12^th Annual Convention of the American Psychological = Society,=20 Miami, FL.

Smartt, F., & = Seitz, J.=20 A. (1999, November). = Aesthetic=20 movement and the bodily basis of thought. Poster presented at the Annual = Meeting=20 of the National Minority Research Symposium, Phoenix, = AZ.

Smartt, F., & = Seitz, J.=20 A. (2000, April). The = embodied=20 mind in dance. Paper = presented=20 at the 40^th Annual Meeting of the Northeastern = Anthropological=20 Association, New York, NY.